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TOWARD THE EUROPEAN FEDERATION? REFORM 
PROCESSES IN THE FINANCIAL STABILITY SYSTEM 
OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, ESPECIALLY TO THE 
EARLY CONCEPT OF EUROPEAN BANKUNION 
János Kálmán 
Since July 2007, the world has faced, and continues to face, the most 
serious and disruptive financial crisis which springs from 1929. The present 
crisis results from the complex interaction of market failures, global 
financial and monetary imbalances, inappropriate regulation, weak 
supervision and poor macro-prudential oversight. In this context the study 
analyses the reforms of the three-legged chair of European financial 
stability. 
INTRODUCTION 
The basic task of the financial system—as a whole—is to provide the 
economy with money. In order to fulfil this task, it collects the small sums 
of savings of households in forms of deposits, to satisfy the more significant 
financial needs of the players of economy by issuing credits to them. In 
order to ensure the finance of economy the financial system cares about the 
safe operation of the payment system in economy. In other words, it makes 
sure the price of goods and services between the players of economy is 
accounted and paid. These are the basic functions, by which the financial 
system realizes the distribution of incomes, in space—between different 
geographical and economical branches, —and time as well, by transforming 
short-term deposits into long-term credits or investments. These functions 
make it possible to handle all the uncertainities and risks immanent in the 
financial system.1 
In order to make for the financial system possible to fulfil these tasks, 
thus promoting or rather supporting sustainable growth and social security 
by means of economic development, the financial system has to operate in a 
stable manner. 
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Financial stability is a condition in which the financial system, 
including the markets of key importance and the system of financial 
institutions itself, shows resistance to economic schocks and is able to 
perform its basic functions. These basic functions are the mediation between 
the financial sources mentioned above, risk assessment and the management 
of financial transactions. 
The world’s economic crisis drew attention to the fact that 
vulnerability of the financial system had to be approached in a complex way. 
What is more, it also should be examined as a complex system, through the 
stability of its elements. 
In the author’s study he will try to review the changes which have 
taken or are still taking place in the three supporting pillars in the structure 
of financial stability in the European Union (EU). The author wishes to pay 
close attention to the experienced or recommended changes regarding the 
financial market supervisory, since the worldwide economic crisis rooted in 
this pillar. The author does not intend to go into further details concerning 
either the monetary or the fiscal pillar in this article. 
I. THE THREE-LEGGED CHAIR OF FINANCIAL STABILITY 
The complex system of financial stability basically relies on three 
pillars. These three pillars are: (1) monetary policy, (2) fiscal policy and (3) 
the operation of financial markets. A great number of connecting points has 
been formed between the pillars, that is why the unsatisfactory operation of 
one of them can quickly spread to the others as well, which results in a loss 
of stability for the whole system. Thus we can approach the phenomenon of 
financial stability as if it was represented by a three-legged chair. Its most 
important feature is that if the three legs are adequate, the chair is steady and 
comfortable for the person sitting on it. However, if any of the legs is 
removed, the chair will obviously collapse. Actually, this is the phenomenon 
we are observing these days, observing the consequences of global crisis, 
which has affected and is still affecting our environment (dramatically 
increasing unemployment, growing debts of households and debt 
rescheduling packages, bank support, broadening social differences) which 
results in a dramatic rise of national (sovereign) debts, and in some 
European states even getting to the edge of bankruptcy. 
Pillars of this three-legged chair has to be placed back to their right 
positions, stability has to be restored. One of the painful, but great truths of 
history is that profound, newly based economic reforms can be realized only 
consequently after economic crises. It worked the same way during the 
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Great Depression, when New Deal introduced a significant intervention on 
state level, and it works the same way today as well. 
A. Pillar No. 1: Monetary Policy 
Monetary policy, symbolized by the first pillar, has partly gained its 
position within the EU. Introducing Euro first as a bank account money, 
later as a legal tender, measures concerning the security of price stability 
(such as the issue of banknotes, currency management as well as managing 
and handling the currency reserves of member states) became controlled by 
European Central Bank. New member states that joined in 2004 already had 
to make a commitment to control their economic policy in order to be able 
to introduce Euro in an adequate economic environment, which would 
eventually lead to a situation where a significant part of their sovereignty 
would be transferred to the supernational organisation, to the European 
Central Bank (ECB). 
As early as the foundation of the monetary union European leaders 
were aware of the fact, that the eurozone did not meet the criteria of an 
optimum currency area 2  as described by Mundell 3  and McKinnon. 4 
Economic circles were not synchronized and even if the European Union 
was based on the free flow of goods, people, labour force and capital, the 
free flow of production factors has not been achieved. Moreover, the inner 
financial transfers did not exist, either. However, one of the reasons the euro 
was called to life was to protect the member states from the crisis symptoms 
of the international financial market. This function proved to be efficient for 
the first decades of the monetary union.5 Problems started to emerge when, 
                                                 
2 The theory of optimum currency areas describes the optimal characteristics for the merger of 
currencies or the creation of a new currency. The optimum currency area is a geographical region in 
which it would maximize economic efficiency to have the entire region share a single currency. 
3 Robert A. Mundell, A Theory of Optimum Currency Areas, THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW 657-
665 (Vol. 51, No. 4, 1961). 
4 Ronald I. McKinnon, Optimum Currency Areas, THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW 717-725 (Vol. 
53, No. 4, 1963). The most important criterions of optimum currency areas are: 1.) labor mobility 
across the region; 2.) openness with capital mobility, price and wage flexibility across the region; 3.) 
a risk sharing system; 4.) the participant countries have the same business cycles. The theory of 
optimum currency areas have very wide literature, for further informations see Gábor Békési, 
Optimális Valutaövezetek, Gazdasági Integráltság és Hasonlatosság: Az Európai Unió Példája, 
KÖZGAZDASÁGI SZEMLE 709-737 (Vol. 45, 1998); A GLOBÁLIS ÉS REGIONÁLIS INTEGRÁCIÓ 
GAZDASÁGTANA 188-194 (András Blahó ed. 2011); Pierre-Richard Agenor & Joshua Aizenman, 
Capital Market Imperfections and the Theory of Optimum Currency Areas, JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL MONEY AND FINANCE 1659-1675 (Vol. 30, Issue 8, 2011). 
5 Margit Rácz, Vélekedés a Válságról az Európai Unióban Kialakult Helyzet Alapján, PÉNZÜGYI 
SZEMLE 311 (Vol. 54, No. 3-4, 2009). 
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as a consequence of the economic crisis, a number of states—Greece, Spain, 
Portugal and Ireland—belonging to the eurozone needed an emergency aid, 
which caused a great loss in trusting the sustainability of euro. What is more, 
some analysts had even visioned the collapse of the euro.6 
If the euro fails, not only the currency fails. Europe fails too, and the idea of 
European unification…We have a common currency, but no common political 
and economic union. And this is exactly what we must change. To achieve this—
therein lies the opportunity of this crisis. 
—Angela Merkel said in 20107 
All the measures that lead to the restoration for the stability of the euro 
need to be found in the two remaining pillars. 
B. Pillar No. 2: The Fiscal Policy 
The economic crisis originated from the financial markets. In order to 
be able to manage it, countries all around the world were forced to offer 
emergency aids to banks financed by credits or taxpayers, to avoid a social 
cataclism caused by the collapse of the system of financial mediation. 
However, these measures resulted in national debts rising incredibly high, 
endangering the operation of states. We can see that the connections 
between the legs or pillars are so profound that in case one of them is 
shaken, others will definitely follow. 
At the time of the introduction of the euro there was not an established 
political consent to the achievement of an economical or monetary union. At 
the same time the member states were not willing to sacrify more of their 
sovereignty. Although experts have emphasised the risks encoded in a 
monetary union without the convergency of budgets, the European Union 
still has not got its own fiscal policy. The monetary and the fiscal policy 
practically represent the two sides of a coin. The problem is rooted in the 
fact that monetary policy is at Union level, while fiscal policy is determined 
by the states. It means that one of the legs ensuring stability is located at a 
higher level, which leads to a basically assimetric structure. What is more, 
experts called attention that the supervision of the institutes of financial 
                                                 
6 Simon Tilford, The Euro at Ten: Is Its Future Secure? CENTER FOR EUROPEAN REFORMS (2009), 
available at 
http://www.cer.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/attachments/pdf/2011/essay_10_euro_7jan09-
1337.pdf (last visited Nov. 02, 2012). 
7 New Austerity Measures for Portugal, Spain (2012), available at 
http://www.euractiv.com/priorities/new-austerity-measures-portugal-news-494137 (last visited Nov. 
02, 2012). 
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markets (such as banks and big holding companies) should have been 
managed at European level.8 
The political will needed for the creation of economic and monetary 
union was eventually born by the world economic crisis. The example of 
Greece showed that the most significant shortcomings of the monetary 
union was that it missed its own budget of crisis management. 
Previous to the foundation of the monetary union, it had been different. 
On one hand, Article 108 of the Treaty of Rome specifically approved a 
mutual aid of the member states in case of unbalance in payments.9 On the 
other hand, the Maastricht Treaty forbade both the Union and the other 
member states issuing such an aid to governments.10 The reason of this was 
a widely accepted agreement among experts which regarded the balance of 
payments within the monetary union as irrelevant as it was within the 
regions of member states.11 
However, there was one back-stair left due to paragraph (2) Article 122, 
which allowed a restricted financial support from the Union for a member 
state struggling difficulties in exceptional cases. Based on this claim EU 
founded the European Financial Stability Mechanism (EFSM),12 a relatively 
small credit device within the system of the Union, and the European 
Financial Stability Facility (EFSF),13 based on an interstate treaty, which is 
a much larger, temporary credit device.14 However, instead of temporary 
crisis management mechanisms, a constant financing mechanism was 
                                                 
8 Mads Andenas & Christos Hadjiemmanuil, Banking Supervision, the Internal Market and European 
Monetary Union, EUROPEAN BUSINESS LAW REVIEW 153 (Vol. 9, 1998). 
9 The mutual assistance could be: a) a concerted approach to or within any other international 
oraganisations to which Member States may have recourse; b) measures needed to avoid defleotion of 
trade where the State which is in difficulities maintains or reintroduces quantitive restrictions against 
third countries; c) the granting of limited credits by other Member States, subject to their agreement. 
10 TFEU Article 125. 1: “The Union shall not be liable for or assume the commitments of central 
governments, regional, local or other public authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or 
public undertakings of any Member State, without prejudice to mutual financial guarantees for the 
joint execution of a specific project. A Member State shall not be liable for or assume the 
commitments of central governments, regional, local or other public authorities, other bodies 
governed by public law, or public undertakings of another Member State, without prejudice to mutual 
financial guarantees for the joint execution of a specific project.” 
11 Jean Pisani-Ferry, The Known Unknowns and Unknown Unknowns of EMU, BRUEGEL POLICY 
CONTRIBUTION 5 (Issue 2012/18, 2012). 
12 Council Regulation (EU) No. 407/2010 of 11 May 2010 establishing a European financial 
stabilisation mechanism. 
13 EFSF Framework Agreement (2012), available at 
http://www.efsf.europa.eu/attachments/20111019_efsf_ framework_agreement_en.pdf (last visited 
Nov. 02, 2012). 
14 About the legal problems see Jean-Victor Louis, Guest Editorial: The No-Bailout Clause and 
Rescue Packages, COMMON MARKET LAW REVIEW 971-986 (Vol. 47, Issue 4, 2010). 
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needed. Member states agreed about the European Stability Mechanism 
(ESM) in December 2010 which started work in 8th October 2012. In order 
to establish ESM the Treaty of Lisbon had to be modified, too. According to 
this, Article 136 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) 
was completed with the following paragraph: 
(3) The Member States whose currency is the euro may establish a stability 
mechanism to be activated if indispensable to safeguard the stability of the euro 
area as a whole. The granting of any required financial assistance under the 
mechanism will be made subject to strict conditionality.15 
The ESM treaty was finalized on 2nd February 2012 in Brussels.16 An 
international financial organisation was established to operate this facility. 
The Luxemburg-based financial institution gives support to the eurozone 
countries if it serves the interest of safeguarding financial stability. ESM can 
be used only at an ultimate phase if the stability of the eurozone is 
threatened. This mechanism works on an intergovernmental base, 
furthermore, the private sector as well as the International Monetary Fund 
has to be involved in its activity.17 
The economic governing of EU, including the fiscal pillar, is 
strengthened by the so-called “six-pack”, which contains five regulations18 
and one directive.19 With the help of these legal acts the Union ensures 
stricter application of the fiscal rules, as well as applying a specific 
forecasting technique in the system by being able to examine and evaluate 
other economic indicators and even punish in case of default. 
                                                 
15 2011/199/EU European Council Decision of 25 March 2011 amending Article 136 of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union with regard to a stability mechanism for Member States 
whose currency is the euro, O.J. L. 91. 2011. 
16 http://www.european-council.europa.eu/media/582311/05-tesm2.en12.pdf (last visited Nov. 02, 
2012). 
17 Bálint Ódor, Az Európai Unió Működéséről Szóló Szerződés 136, Cikkének Módosítása, EURÓPAI 
TÜKÖR 37 (Vol. 16, No. 2, 2011). 
18 Regulation (EU) No. 1173/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 
2011 on the effective enforcement of budgetary surveillance in the euro area; Regulation (EU) No. 
1174/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on enforcement 
measures to correct excessive macroeconomic imbalances in the euro area; Regulation (EU) No. 
1175/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 amending Council 
Regulation (EC) No. 1466/97 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the 
surveillance and coordination of economic policies; Regulation (EU) No. 1176/2011 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on the prevention and correction of 
macroeconomic imbalances; Council Regulation (EU) No. 1177/2011 of 8 November 2011 amending 
Regulation (EC) No. 1467/97 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive 
deficit procedure. 
19 Council Directive 2011/85/EU of 8 November 2011 on requirements for budgetary frameworks of 
the Member States. 
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The European Semester,20 being part of the “sick-pack”, is actually an 
integrated fiscal supervising mechanism, in other words, a yearly cycle of 
economic policy coordination. It is actually the pillar realizing the Europe 
2020 strategy.21 Unlike the Stability and Growth Pact, it is based on the 
logics of prevention, being more efficient, than the application of correction 
mechanisms. Within the framework of the European Semester, each year the 
European Commission undertakes a detailed analysis of EU Member States’ 
programmes of economic and structural reforms and provides them with 
recommendations for the next 12-18 months (state specific 
recommendations). 
The so-called “two-pack”, which means two more regulations, aims at 
further strengthening the surveillance mechanisms in the euro area.22 Work 
on the “two-pack” is still in progress. 
The Euro Plus Pact,23 as agreed by the eurozone heads of state or heads 
of governments will further strengthen the economic pillar of EU and 
achieve a new quality of economic policy coordination, with the objective of 
improving competitiveness and thereby leading to a higher degree of 
convergence. Apart from Member States, the Pact was joined by Bulgaria, 
Denmark, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania and Romania as well. 
The brief outline of the measures, aimed at strengthening the fiscal 
pillar follow the policy of introducing definitely more fiscal regulations at 
national level in order to minimalize the risks of “tickery” within the 
umbrella of the common currency.24 However, it may cause a great loss in 
the fiscal sovereignty of the Member States. On one hand, at a long term the 
convergency and the strictness of fiscal regulations is definitely a 
forwarding process, as it is vital for to restore the stability of the euro. On 
                                                 
20 Regulation (EU) No. 1175/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 
2011 amending Council Regulation (EC) No. 1466/97 on the strengthening of the surveillance of 
budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies. 
21 Márk Bató, Az Európai Szemeszter, Az Európai Szemeszter Szerepe az Európai Unió 
Gazdaságpolitikájának Kialakításában, Különös Tekintettel a Kohéziós Politikára, KÖZ-GAZDASÁG 
105 (Vol. 7, No. 1, 2012). 
22 COM (2011) 819: Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
strengthening of economic and budgetary surveillance of Member States experiencing or threatened 
with serious difficulties with respect to their financial stability in the euro area; COM (2011) 821: 
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on common provisions for 
monitoring and assessing draft budgetary plans and ensuring the correction of excessive deficit of the 
Member States in the euro area. 
23 The Euro Plus Pact—Stronger Economic Policy Coordination for Competitiveness and 
Convergence, European Council (24/25 Mar. 2011) Conclusions, Annex I, available at 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/120296.pdf (last visited Nov. 
03, 2012). 
24 Marek Dabrowski, Fiscal and Monetary Policy Determinants of the Eurozone Crisis and Its 
Resolution, CASE NETWORK STUDIES & ANALYSES 31 (No. 443, 2012). 
2013                 REFORM PROCESSES                  53 
 
the other hand, it raises the question of how many rates of speed the Union 
can tolerate. These regulations suggests the idea of a fiscal union as far as 
the Member States are concerned, which would not work at community 
level anymore, but at a kind of federative one, with all its consequences. 
These thoughts are somewhat diverting from the real aim of the study, 
which is meant to be a systematic review of reform procedures. In order to 
restore and maintain financial stability, after strengthening the monetary and 
fiscal pillar, a stronger financial market supervision has an outstanding 
significance. 
II. CHANGES IN THE REGULATIONS AND SUPERVISION OF FINANCIAL 
MARKETS 
The beginnings of striving for an unified financial market in Europe 
leads back to the 70’s.25  “As early as that the establishment of such a 
financial environment was started, which could guarantee secure financial 
transactions in different member states of the Union.”26 The First Banking 
Directive was adopted in 1977, 20 years after the Treaty of Rome. This was 
nevertheless only the first step, after which markets still remained 
functioning separately, as the governments of the different countries had 
different interests regarding the financial system. As a consequence, it was 
rather difficult for financial institutions to perform indirect transactions 
crossing the borders. 
The breakthrough, an acceleration in the integration of the financial 
market started in 1985. This was the year when the “White Book” was 
published by the Commission. 27  The White Book outlined three basic 
principles: (1) the principle of home-country control, (2) the principle of 
mutual recognition28 and (3) the principle of minimum harmonisation of 
                                                 
25 LARISA DRAGOMIR, EUROPEAN PRUDENTIAL BANKING REGULATION AND SUPERVISION—THE LEGAL 
DIMENSION 33 (2010). 
26 Judit Lengyel, Éva Réz & Olivér Szép, A Tőkepiacok Szabályozásának Aktuális Kérdései, DÉL–
KELET EURÓPA—SOUTH-EAST EUROPE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS QUARTERLY 3 (Vol. 2, No. 7, 
2012). 
27 COM (85) 310: Completing the Internal Market, available at http://europa.eu/documents/comm/ 
white_papers/pdf/com19 85_0310_f_en.pdf (last visited Nov. 03, 2012). 
28 The principle of mutual recognition was made by the European Court of Justice in 1979. It was the 
famous case of Cassais de Dijon. The principle of mutual recognition guarantees free movement of 
goods and services without the need to harmonise Member States’ national legislation. Goods 
(services) which are lawfully produced in one Member State cannot be banned from sale on the 
territory of another Member State, even if they are produced to technical or quality specifications 
different from those applied to its own products. The only exception allowed—overriding general 
interest such as health, consumer or environment protection—is subject to strict conditions. See Rewe 
kontra Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwe, in 1979 C-120/78 European Court of Justice. 
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national laws. It is supplemented by the policy of the Single Passport, 
which means that different financial institutions has to bear the same 
operational licence. If such a licence is obtained in one of the member states, 
it means the institution is allowed to work in any other member state 
without a special licence.29 Whether the institution controls its operation 
according to the freedom of settlement (establishing a branch office) or the 
freedom of service (without establishing a branch office, with cross-border 
service) it depends on the institution itself. 
At the end of the 90’s, though the integration of financial markets had 
accelerated, the European Union had to face the fact that markets had still 
remained segmented.30 The introduction of the euro represented a unique 
chance for the Union to integrate the sphere of financial service and remove 
the remaining frontiers within the market. Therefore in 1999 the so-called 
Financial Service Action Plan (hereafter: FSAP) was adopted. The three 
strategic objective of the plan were the establishment of an integrated 
market in the areas of institutional or enterprising financial market service, 
to open and safeguard the public service of financial markets as well as 
strengthen the regulations of prudential supervision. Prudential supervision 
was reinforced by the reform of the financial supervisory structure of the 
Union in parallel with the FSAP. It was called the Lamfalussy process.31 
Regulating the financial market is expected by both the regulators and 
society to ensure the security and the stability of the financial industry, 
while the stability of the global financial system is also given.32 Due to 
FSAP “financial industry’s performance has improved; there is higher 
liquidity, increased competition, sound profitality and stronger financial 
stability despite much external turbulence”.33 As for the improvement of 
integration, White Book II outlined further legal activities (including the 
revision of previous regulations). 
In 2007 the economic crisis began, which put the regulation system of 
                                                 
29 HAJNALKA LŐRINCNÉ ISTVÁNFFY, PÉNZÜGYI INTEGRÁCIÓ EURÓPÁBAN 173 (2001). 
30 COM (1999) 232: Implementing the Framework for Financial Markets: Action Plan, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/docs/actionplan/index/action_en.pdf 3 (last visited Nov. 
03, 2012). 
31 Further details about the Lamfalussy progress see Sideek Mohamed, Reform of the EU Securities 
Markets: A Critical Assessment of the Lamfalussy Report, BUSINESS LAW INTERNATIONAL (Issue 3, 
2002); EILÍS FERRAN, BUILDING AN EU SECURITIES MARKET (2004); Duncan Alford, The Lamfalussy 
Process and EU Bank Regulation: Another Step on the Road to Pan-European Regulation, ANNUAL 
REVIEW OF BANKING AND FINANCIAL LAW (Vol. 25, 2006); DRAGOMIR supra. 
32 András Blahó, Az Átalakuló Globális Pénzügyi Szabályozó Rendszer Kérdései, KÖZ-GAZDASÁG 49 
(Vol. 6, No. 2, 2011). 
33 White Paper—Financial Services Policy 4 (2005-2010) (hereafter: White Paper II.), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/docs/white_paper/white_paper_en.pdf (last visited Nov. 
10, 2012). 
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the EU on the test. The EU responded to the unbalanced phenomena like 
never before, by preparing, adopting and putting into force a wide range of 
legal acts.34 However, the integrated markets of the EU need not only an ex 
post regulation, but a direct supervision by the union. 
The long-term strategy of European integration—the Europe 2030 
Project—also adopted the policy, that is: 
If the EU is to avoid a repeat of the crisis, it must urgently undertake 
reforms to the functioning and supervision of our financial institutions. Today, 
these financial institutions have changed few of the practices which led to the 
crisis, except to significantly reduce their lending. It would be desirable for these 
reforms to be coordinated among the G20, but until this happens, the EU must 
develop its own regulatory norms and mechanisms for control and supervision.35 
On 2011 January 1st a completely new EU supervisory structure, the 
European System of Financial Supervisors was formed, based on the 
Lamfalussy process and its experience. 
In this European System of Financial Szupervisors there are two pillars, 
a macro (ESRB)36 and a microprudential pillar (ESAs)37 working in order to 
maintain financial stability for the whole European Union, find solutions to 
forecast crises and manage them. It is an ambitious, though necessary task, 
for which the authorities have to be armed with adequate devices. 
Accordingly, supervisory authorities became armed with new device of 
power of a different quality. 
                                                 
34 See, e.g., Regulation (EC) No. 1060/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 
September 2009 on credit rating agencies; Directive 2009/138/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 25 November 2009 on the taking-up and pursuit of the business of Insurance and 
Reinsurance (Solvency II); Directive 2009/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
13 July 2009 on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to 
Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities (UCITS), Directive 2009/111/EC 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 amending Directives 
2006/48/EC, 2006/49/EC and 2007/64/EC as regards banks affiliated to central institutions, certain 
own funds items, large exposures, supervisory arrangements, and crisis management (CRD II). 
35 Project Europe 2030—Challanges and Opportunities 5, available at 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cm sUpload/en_web.pdf (last visited Nov. 05, 2012). 
36 Regulation (EU) No. 1092/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 
2010 on European Union macro-prudential oversight of the financial system and establishing a 
European Systemic Risk Board. 
37 Regulation (EU) No. 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 
2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority), amending 
Decision No. 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/78/EC; Regulation (EU) No. 
1094/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a 
European Supervisory Authority (European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority), 
amending Decision No. 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/79/EC; Regulation 
(EU) No. 1095/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 
establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Securities and Markets Authority), 
amending Decision No. 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/77/EC. 
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The preparation of regulatory technical standards and implementing 
technical standards will primarily be the authorities work, even if the 
Commission brings decisions about their adoption. Decisions made by the 
European authorities38 are legally binding not only on the authorities at 
national level, but eventually on players in the financial markets. What is 
more, the decisions adopted under the ESAs regulations shall prevail over 
any previous decision adopted by the competent authorities on the same 
matter. Enabling a direct supervision of private companies at the Union’s 
level (in restricted cases!),39 the supervisory policy of the given country was 
seriously damaged by the new regulation. 
As well as the existance of direct supervision of private companies in 
restricted cases, the power of pure direct supervision also appeared among 
the competencies of the European Securities Markets Authority (ESMA). 
Namely, after the establishment of the new European System of Financial 
Supervisors it became possible to raise the licensing and supervision of 
credit-rating agencies to the European level. In accordance, regulation 
513/2011/EU amended regulation 1060/2009/EK regarding credit-rating 
agencies and the ESMA regulation defined the direct European supervision 
of credit-rating agencies as a special task of ESMA. If during its activity it 
observes a violation of the law by the credit-rating agency, it has the right to 
order a supervisory measure or impose a fine.40 
These reforms have represented a significant change in the European 
Union, though the appearance of the supervision on a direct union level 
foresaw further steps of integration (broadening the range of competences of 
the Union).41 This tendency was supported by the sovereign debt crisis, 
which resulted in one thing being stabile, and that was instability. The 
President of the European Council and the European Comission set the aim 
of establishing a “genuine economic and monetary union”.42 
                                                 
38 The ESAs decisions includes three types of legally binding decisons: I.) decision in breach of union 
law (ESAs reg. Art. 17), II.) actions in emergency situations (ESAs reg. Art. 18), and III.) decisions in 
settlement of disagreements between competent authorities in cross-border situations (ESAs reg. Art. 
19). 
39 About the limits of the new supervisory authorities see Stijn Verhelst, Renewed Financial 
Supervision in Europe—Final or Transitory?, EGMONT PAPER 48-57 (No. 44, 2011). 
40 The III Annex of the regulation includes a “black list” about the credit rating agencies’ 
infringements. The regulation classifies the infringements: a) Infringements related to conflicts of 
interest, organisational or operational requirements; b) Infringements related to obstacles to the 
supervisory activities and c) Infringements related to disclosure provisions. 
41 János Kálmán, Az új Európai Pénzügyi Felügyeleti Architektúra, in MAGYARORSZÁG ÉS AZ EURÓPAI 
UNIÓ—DÍJNYERTES PÁLYÁZATOK 2011, 88 (Csaba Gergely Tamás ed. 2012). 
42 Toward a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union—Interim Report (Brussels, Oct. 12, 2012), 
available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/132809.pdf (last 
visited Nov. 10, 2012). 
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This conception, also known as bankunion, means an integrated or 
rather a centralized financial framework, which includes: 1) an integrated 
resolution mechanism; 2) an integrated deposit-guarantee mechanism; and 
3) a single supervisory mechanism. The author intends to give only a brief 
review the resolution and deposit-guarantee mechanisms, while going in 
details concerning the single supervisory mechanism. 
A. The Integrated Resolution Mechanism43 
Economic crisis put the problem-solving abilities of both the national 
and the union level authorities on a hard test, concerning the bank system. 
The financial markets of the Union, due to the previously described 
processes, have become integrated to the extent that an internal economic 
shock within a member state can easily spread to other member states as 
well. 
In most European countries the same proceedings in insolvency are to 
be applied for banks, as for other enterprises. However, banks are regarded 
as special compared to other enterprises, for at least three reasons: 1) banks 
are opaque, because they access information that other players of the market 
cannot do (bank secrecy); 2) banks act as performers of deposit-taking and 
lending, thus they transform short-term commitments into long-term 
products; 3) banks incur special risks (domino effect). 44  Insolvency 
regulations cannot always manage the bankruptcy of financial institutes, 
because they do not considerate the avoidance of instability, ensuring the 
continuous operation of basic service and protect deposit owners. What is 
more, proceedings in insolvency are circuitous and in case or re-
organisation it is necessary to reach an agreement through long and difficult 
series of negotiations. This may cause a loss in forms of time, cost and an 
insufficient result to both party. 
In case of a state resolution it is the state which makes a decision on the 
resolution of the enterprise in question, which, at least theoretically, goes 
together with the central sources playing the leading role in restoring the 
financial balance.45 Contrarily, the European resolution system outlined in 
                                                 
43 COM (2012) 280: Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms 
and amending Council Directives 77/91/EEC, 82/891/EC, 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 
2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC and 2011/35/EC and Regulation (EU) No. 1093/2011, available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/Le UriServ.do?uri= COM:2 012:0280:FIN:EN:PDF (last visited 
Nov. 10, 2012). 
44 DRAGOMIR, supra at 27-30. 
45 Anna Kúti & Mária Móra, Szanálás és Felszámolás 1986 Után, KÖZGAZDASÁGI SZEMLE 703 (Vol. 
37, No. 6, 1990). 
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the proposal would be based on the idea of establishing a bank resolution 
fund from previous bank payments on the member states level, which could 
finance the restoration of near-bankrupt banks. This way it would not be the 
taxpayers who would bear the risks of the bank system, but the system itself 
(providing that the bank did not transfer the cost to the clients!). 
In market economies state resolution is regarded as an exceptional 
device of crisis management.46 That is why the proposal would broaden the 
competence of national supervisory authorities, so that they could intervene 
at an early stage in case the financial state or the solvency of an institute 
declined. Within the framework of such an early intervention the institute 
can be called upon the execution of regulations and measures, as defined in 
the resolution plan, preparation and execution of a proceeding programme 
and a schedule and summon a general meeting of the share-holders. 
Resolution measures can only be taken in case of or near bankruptcy, and 
there is not a solution to restore the institution within an acceptable period 
of time. Moreover, the intervention aiming at resolution has to be justified 
by public weel as well. 
The proposal of the commission is aimed at the harmonisation of the 
system of resolution authorities at member state level, which could work 
according to common regulations. However, if the enhanced supervision 
within the bankunion was created, it would have to give place to a more 
centralised management of bank crises. 47  In order to realize this, 
according to the plans, a European resolution authority should be formed 
regarding state members within the bank union, which could eliminate all 
those negative externalities caused by decisions made at purely national 
level.48 
B. The Integrated Deposit Guarantee Mechanism 
The principle of “minimal harmonisation”, applied in 94/19/EC 
directive about deposit guarantee mechanisms results in very different 
coverage levels by the different member states, so 2009/14 EC directive 
fixed the minimal margin at 100,000 Euro. It was necessary because when 
the financial crisis deteriorated during the autumn of 2008, certain Union 
deposit owners tranferred their deposits from states with lower coverage 
                                                 
46 Id. at 703. 
47 COM (2012) 510: Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the 
Council on a Roadmap towards a Banking Union 8. 
48 Press Release—Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union 5 (Jun. 26, 2012), available at 
http://www.consilium .europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/131201.pdf (last visited Nov. 
10, 2012). 
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levels to ones ensuring better coverage levels. These differences caused 
serious deformations.49 
In July 2010 the Commission made an even more ambitious proposal 
to create the Paneuropean Deposit Guarantee Scheme. In this scheme they 
urged the harmonisation and the simplification of deposit protection, the 
acceleration of payments and enhancement of finance, particularly through 
deposit insurance funds filled up by previous contributions and funding 
devices between deposit protection systems of member states, mandatory 
within the given limits.50 
According to the primary principle ultimate responsibility should stay 
at the same level in both cases of deposit protection and financial 
supervision.51 Expert analysts suggest the solution that the deposit guarantee 
system should be connected to the resolution system at a European level, 
thus establishing the European Deposit Insurance and Resolution Fund.52 
This solution could enable a quick and efficient decision making, which has 
a vital role in crisis management. 
Resolution and deposit insurance system has the same purpose. Both 
have the common aim of bearing the costs of future crises by previously 
established funds of financial institutes instead of tax payers. 
C. The Single Supervisory Mechanism 
The third pillar of the bank union is the forming of the single 
supervisory mechanism. It is necessary because, as described above, bank 
supervisory, being split up at national levels, have not kept up with the 
integration of bank markets. 
Based on the single supervisory mechanism, it is the European Central 
Bank (ECB) that would supervise banks at an integrated union level. Within 
this framework ECB could directly control the strict and impartial 
enforcement of prudential regulations as well as an efficient control of 
                                                 
49 COM (2010) 369: Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and to the Council, 
Review of Directive 94/19/EC on Deposit Guarantee Schemes 3. 
50 Proposal for a Directive: EU of the European Parliament and of the Council—On Deposit 
Guarantee Schemes (recast), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/docs/guarantee/2010071 2_proposal_en.pdf (last visited Nov. 
03, 2012). 
51 Dirk Schoenmaker & Daniel Gros, A European Depsit Insurance and Resolution Fund, DSF 
POLICY PAPER 7 (No. 21, 2012). 
52 FRANKLIN ALLEN ET ALL, CROSS-BORDER BANKING IN EUROPE: IMPLICATIONS FOR FINANCIAL 
STABILITY AND MACROECONOMIC POLICIES 107-108 (2011); Maria Gerhardt & Karel Lannoo, Options 
for Reforming Deposit Protection Schemes in the EU, ECRI POLICY BRIEF 11-13 (No. 4, 2011); 
SCHOENMAKER & GROS supra at 4. 
60                       US-CHINA LAW REVIEW             Vol. 10:46 
 
cross-border bank markets.53 The Proposal suggests that from the moment 
the regulation comes into force, the ECB should apply its supervisory tasks 
to any banks, in particular banks which have received or requested public 
financial assistance. After this date, from July 1st 2013 the most important 
European banks with system level significance (European Systemically 
Important Financial Institutions, ESIFIs), later, after 1st January 2014, all 
the remaining banks would be supervised by the ECB.54 The author would 
call this proposal ambitious, even irrealistic, considering the fact that the 
date of writing this study is November 2012 and the regulation has not been 
adopted yet. As a matter of fact, the economic crisis prompts the legislator 
of the Union and its engine, the Commission as well, to get regulations 
adopted they regard vital as soon as possible. However, speed should never 
be put forward at the expense of quality! 
The single supervisory mechanism would concern countries which 
have euro as the official currency (eurozone country), with the opportunity 
for other states to join. The Proposal calls it close cooperation, though it is 
not a simple cooperation, but essentially makes national supervision 
authorities deconcentrated organisations of ECB, as far as the financial 
supervisory of banks is concerned. 
The close cooperation between the ECB and the national competent 
authority of a non participating Member State shall be established, by a 
decision adopted by the ECB, where the following conditions are met: (1) 
the Member State concerned notifies the other Member States, the 
Commission, the ECB and the European Banking Authority (EBA) the 
request to enter into a close cooperation with the ECB in relation its new 
tasks; (2) the Member State undertakes to ensure that its national competent 
authority will abide by any guidelines or requests issued by the ECB; (3) the 
Member State undertakes to provide all information on the credit 
institutions established in that Member State that the ECB may require for 
the purpose of carrying out a comprehensive assessment of those credit 
institutions; and (4) the Member State concerned has adopted national legal 
acts to ensure that its national competent authority will be obliged to adopt 
any measure in relation to credit institutions requested by the ECB. 
In case the given member state does not meet these requirements 
anymore, the ECB in its discretional power may decide on terminating close 
cooperation. The subordinative feature of national authorities is also 
emphasised by the fact that in case of termination of close cooperation the 
                                                 
53 COM (2012) 511: Proposal for a Council Regulation conferring specific tasks on the ECB 
concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions (hereafter: Proposal). 
54 Proposal Art. 27. 
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Proposal does not institutionalize any previous consultation mechanism. 
Due to the single supervisory mechanism the ECB shall, in accordance 
with the relevant provisions of Union law, be exclusively competent to carry 
out, for prudential supervisory purposes, in relation to all credit institutions 
established in the participating Member States.55 In accordance with this, 
the ECB would authorise credit institutions and withdraw authorisation if 
necessary; to assess acquisitions and disposals of holdings in credit 
institutions; only int he cases specifically set out in Union acts, ECB shall 
set higher prudential requirements and apply additional measures to credit 
institutions; ECB may carry out supervisory stress tests; it may also carry 
out supervisory tasks in relation to early intervention etc..56 The ECB is 
allowed to make regulations, adopt proposals and make decisions regarding 
all these tasks. 
To perform its supervisory role the ECB would have significant 
investigational power as well. The ECB would have the right to ask direct 
information from any legal or individual entity57 within its competence. It 
may process all the necessary inspections of these entities; it may ask for 
documents, may examine their books and records and also may ask for a 
written or oral explanation. The ECB also may lead on side inspections, 
even without prior announcement. These examinations have to be abided. 
For the purpose of carrying out the tasks conferred upon it by this study, 
where credit institutions, financial holding companies, or mixed financial 
holding companies, intentionally or negligibly, breach a requirement under 
directly applicable Union acts in relation to which administrative pecuniary 
sanctions shall be available to competent authorities under Union law, the 
ECB may impose administrative pecuniary sanctions of up to twice the 
amount of the profits gained or losses avoided because of the breach where 
those can be determined, or up to 10% of the total annual turnover of a legal 
person in the preceding business year. The sanction taken has to be effective, 
proportionate and dissuasive. 
                                                 
55 “After the decision by the Eurozone council, some commentators have argued that the ECB would 
only cater for the larger, systematically important banks, whereas the member states’ authorities 
would remain responsible for smaller banks.” Karel Lannoo, The Roadmap to Banking Union: A Call 
for Consistency, CEPS COMMENTARY 4-5 (2012). 
56 Proposal Art. 4. 
57 The ECB’s investigatory powers would cover: a) credit institutions, b) financial holding companies, 
c) mixed financial holding companies, d) mixed-activity holding companies, e) persons involved in 
the activities of the entities referred to in (a) to (d), and related third parties, f) third parties to whom 
the entities referred to in (a) to (d) have outsourced operational functions or activities, g) persons 
otherwise closely and substantially related or connected to the activities of the entities referred to in (a) 
to (d), h) national competent authorities. 
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Followed by the brief outline of the most important reforms of the 
supervisory mechanism, it is inevitable to talk about the problems 
concerning which the author previously underlined that speed should never 
be put forward at the expense of quality! The author intends to highlight two 
topics: 1) the separation of monetary policy and institutional (micro) level 
supervision, and 2) the relations between ECB and EBA. 
1. The Separation of Monetary Policy and Institutional (Micro Level) 
Supervision 
The first problem is to be found in the centralisation of monetary 
policy and institutional (micro) level supervision into one organisation. 
There is the fundamental problem of having a built-in conflict of interest 
between monetary policy and financial supervision.58 The primary objective 
of monetary policy—as it described in TFEU paragraph 1 Article 127—
shall be to maintain price stability, that is, to stop inflation. Contrarily, the 
financial supervision concentrates on the safety and soundness of individual 
institutions. 
Monetary policy in certain situations favours other facts than financial 
supervisory does. Such a case could be when the central bank radically 
raises interest rates in order to maintain the stability of macro economy, 
which at the same time devaluates the coverage behind debenture-type 
investments, thus risking the secure functioning of the individual 
institution.59 This is the reason why the two functions, if concentrated at the 
same institution, has to be separated the adequate way in order to save their 
integrity.60 
The separation of functions, despite of the Proposal emphasising it,61 
remains insufficient. According to the Proposal, an internal body, a 
supervisory board shall be established within the ECB, to the planning and 
execution of the tasks conferred upon the ECB. However, the ECB’s 
Governing Council would be ultimately charged for decision making, in 
exceptional cases having the right to delegate clearly defined supervisory 
tasks and related decisions regarding individuals. These delegated tasks also 
subjects to the oversight and responsibility of the Governing Council. At the 
                                                 
58 See for more details, Charles Goodhart & Dirk Schoenmaker, Should the Functions of Monetary 
Policy and Banking Supervision Be Separeted?, OXFORD ECONOMIC PAPERS, NEW SERIES 539-560 
(Vol. 47, No. 4, 1995). 
59 ERDŐS & MÉRŐ supra at 276. 
60 Jacopo Carmassi, Carmine Di Noia & Stefano Micossi, Bankin Union: A Federal Model for the 
European Union with Prompt Corrective Action, CEPS POLICY BRIEF 4 (No. 282, 2012). 
61 Proposal 8. 
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same time, the Governing Council of ECB consists of the members of 
ECB’s Executive Board and governors of national central banks of member 
states in which the common currency is euro. In other words, countries 
which join the single supervisory mechanism through close cooperation, are 
precluded in the right to vote. 
Members of the supervisory board are: 1) four ECB representatives 
appointed by the ECB’s Executive Board; 2) one representative from each 
of the national authorities functioning as supervisor of the financial 
institutes of participating member states; 62  3) a Chair elected by the 
Governing Council from the members of the Executive Board with exeption 
of the President, and 4) a Vice Chair elected by and from the Governing 
Council from its own members. Most probably, though it is not mentioned 
in the Proposal, these members will have the right to vote in the Supervisory 
Board. 
From members of the supervisory board a steering committee may be 
appointed based on a more restricted selection, which supports the work of 
the supervisory board. The representatives of the competent authority of the 
Member States which established a close cooperation in accordance with 
Article 6 shall take part to the activities of the supervisory board in 
accordance with the conditions set out in the decision adopted by the ECB. 
The Chair of the European Banking Authority and a member of the 
European Commission may also participate as observers in the meetings of 
the supervisory board. 
Therefore it is obvious that monetary policy and institution supervision 
are definitely not separated from each other. What is more, the 2nd 
paragraph of Article 18 of the Proposal emphasises that the tasks rooting 
from the ECB’s supervisory function may not interfere with the ECB’s tasks 
relating to monetary policy and any othe tasks. This implies that monetary 
policy must abide by in its new functions. Furthermore, those non-eurozone 
countries which join the single supervisory mechanism, are hardly given any 
rights, but more obligations. 
What can be the reason of placing the union level supervisory of banks 
within the organisation of ECB by all means? In the author’s opinion the EU 
simply has not got any other legal basis to build up this structure, unless it 
amends the founding treaties. Such an amendment, though, is a long and 
difficult process. The single legal basis, on which the single supervisory 
                                                 
62 “Participating Member State” means a Member State whose currency is the euro. The definition of 
participating Member States does not include Member States joining to the single supervisory 
mechanism by close cooperation. 
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mechanism may be established is TFEU Article 127, as follows: 
(6) The Council, acting by means of regulations in accordance with a special 
legislative procedure, may unanimously, and after consulting the European 
Parliament and the European Central Bank, confer specific tasks upon the 
European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision 
of credit institutions and other financial institutions with the exception of 
insurance undertakings. 
Even the regulations deciding about the establishment of European 
Supervisory Authorities were seriously criticised both by national 63  and 
international experts, 64  because the system of functions of the ESAs 
exceeded the criterions of delegation of power, which criterions was built up 
by the European Court.65 Therefore, based on the current founding treaties, 
it is not possible to transfer the powers of (discretionary) supervision to 
EBA. After taking this into consideration, there may be two possible 
solutions. 
According to the first one, 66  ECB would attend the supervisory 
function, following the Proposal, but by the establishment of a completely 
independent inner Supervisory Board, absolutely separated from monetary 
policy. This Supervisory Board could be formed after the Governing 
Council of ECB, and would consist of a Steering Committee and the chair 
person of the national supervisory authorities. Members of the Steering 
Committee would be: the six members appointed by the Council, one of the 
Vice-Presidents of ECB, the Chair of EBA as well as the Managing Director 
of ESM. This structure could enhance efficient coordination between the 
institutions, thus avoiding the financial supervision being subordinated by 
monetary policy. At the same time it would involve ESM in decision 
making, which in the future may as well contribute to deposit guarantee and 
resolution. The Supervisory Board would be responsible for financial 
supervision and would not accept orders concerning its competence from the 
                                                 
63 See László Szegedi, A Pénzügyi Felügyeletek Európai Rendszere a Meroni-Doktrína Tükrében, Pro 
PUBLICO BONO (Vol. 1, No. 1, 2011); László Szegedi, A Pénzügyi Piacok Közvetlen Európai 
Felügyeletének Kihívásai, PÉNZÜGYI SZEMLE (Vol. 57, No. 3, 2012); KÁLMÁN supra. 
64 See Eddy Wymeersch, The Institutional Reform of the European Financial Supervisory System, An 
Interim Report, GHENT UNIV. FINANCIAL LAW INSTITUTE WORKING PAPER (No. 2010-01, 2010); 
Lorenzo Sasso & Nicolette Kost de Sevres, The New European Financial Markets Legal Framework: 
A Real Improvement? An Analysis of Financial Law and Governance in European Capital Markets 
from a Micro and Macro Economic Perspective, CAPITAL MARKETS LAW JOURNAL (Vol. 7, No. 1, 
2012); Eilís Ferran, Understanding the New Institutional Architecture of EU Financial Market 
Supervision, UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE FACULTY OF LAW RESEARCH PAPER (No. 29/2011, 2011). 
65 See Meroni v. High Authority, 1958 Case 9/56 European Court of Justice; Giuseppe Romano v. 
Institut National D’assurance Maladie-Invalidité, 1981 Case 98/80 European Court of Justice. 
66 Based on CARMASSI, DI NOIA & MICOSSI supra. 
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Governing Council of ECB, which would only be in charge of monetary 
policy. However, a problem still remains in case of this solution as well. 
Namely, the ECB would not have any power in the supervision of insurance 
companies, though there is a great number of connections between the 
activity of banks and insurance companies in the financial sector. A 
microprudential type of supervision, of which the competence of insurance 
is excluded, means a lot of risk in itself.67 
According to a second solution, all the supervisory tasks and 
competences would be transferred to EBA. Thus, a confrontation with 
monetary policy could be avoided as well as the risks of the insurance sector 
would not remain hidden, due to the cooperation with the European 
Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA). 
This solution would also serve the policy of institutional balance, since 
the concentration of supervisory functions in ECB would create a significant 
concentration of power, too. 68  In accordance with the above written, it 
would raise serious doubts regarding legal basis, whether it could be 
possible to organise the supervision of banks in this very structure, without 
the amendment of the founding treaties. 
2. The Relation between ECB and EBA 
The Proposal suggests a role of key importance concerning the single 
supervisory mechanism, by the fact that the EBA would remain in charge 
of creating the Single Rulebook. This function will have an outstanding 
significance in safeguarding the integrity of the sigle market, even in 
connection with member states which do not transfer their supervisory 
functions to ECB, as the rulebook will apply to all the member states of 
EU. 
Experts fear that the role of EBA will have to be completely re-defined, 
if the single supervisory mechanism is carried out the way described above, 
because losing the opportunity to function as a supervisor, it will have to 
concentrate rather on the supervision of the counduct of business and the 
regulation of products regarding the bank sector.69 In other words, it will 
have to strengthen its functions of consumer protection and financial 
                                                 
67 The High Level Group on Financial Supervision Is the EU: De Larosiere Report 43-44 (Brussel, 
Feb. 25, 2009), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/docs/de_larosiere_report_en.pdf (last visited Oct. 10, 
2012). 
68 Jean Pisani-Ferry et all, What Kind of European Banking Union? BRUEGEL POLICY CONTRIBUTION 
12 (Issue 2012/12, 2012). 
69 LANNOO supra at 6 (2012). 
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activity, as it is regulated in article 9 in EBA regulations,70 and European 
supervisory architecture will result in a similarity to the so-called “twin 
peaks” model.71 The competence in consumer protection is to be enhanced 
also because an efficient financial consumer protection is one of the 
important elements of the stability of financial markets. 
The effective financial consumer protection is a crucial pillar of financial 
stability; transparent products and services, fair and accurate information to 
customers, responsible service providers and generally satisfied customers all 
form the basis of confidence in the sector…financial consumer protection is an 
integral and inseparable part of traditional supervision. Prudential market 
supervision and consumer protection mandates help strengthen financial stability 
and the expansion of financial intermediation at single institution and systemic 
level.72 
In connection with the relations between ECB and EBA, not repeating 
any of the written in the previous subsection, it is important to highlight that 
the President of EBA shall not be involved in the work of the Supervisory 
Board of the ECB as an observer, but with the right to vote, through which 
he can work more efficiently in the supervision and extortion of executing 
the regulations of the hand book. 
CONCLUSION 
The crisis of the euro, the common currency of European Union, and 
consequently the crisis of European integration have been going on since 
2007 and we still cannot see the light at the end of this tunnel. Since the 
outbreak of the economic crisis the Union has been trying to use every effort 
to find its way out and restore the economy in Europe. During this process 
decision makers have already introduced significant reforms concerning the 
European Union. It is enough to refer to the measures taken in order to 
strengthen the fiscal pillar, or the changes made in the field of supervision 
of financial markets. However, reforms that already have been or still 
waiting to be achieved, are constantly raising questions on the future of the 
                                                 
70 For example: collecting, analysing and reporting on consumer trends; developing training standards 
for the industry reviewing and coordinating financial literacy and education initiatives by the 
competent authorities; contributing to the development of common disclosure rules. 
71 About the “Twin peaks” approach see Eddy Wymeersch, The Structure of Financial Supervision in 
Europe about Single, Twin Peaks and Multiple Financial Supervisors, EUROPEAN BUSINESS 
ORGANIZATION LAW REVIEW (Vol. 8, Issue 2, 2007). 
72 The HFSA’s Concumer Protection Risk Report 4 (July-December, 2010), available at 
http://www.pszaf.hu/data /cms2309653/cons_report_2010H2.pdf (last visited Nov. 03, 2012). (HFSA 
is the Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority.) 
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European Union, predicting the potential of a political union (federation) 
approaching. 
The reforms outlined within the structure of the Bankunion is a great 
step toward taking a merely new stand of the European Union. The 
elements of financial stability have to be restored by all means. Moreover, 
fiscal discipline has to be strengthened and effective mechanisms have to 
be developed for the supervision of the players in financial markets. These 
changes altogether may be able to stop the instability of the monetary 
pillar. The most important objective is, though, to get financial stability 
steady indeed, that is, to have its elements at the same level. Whether that 
level should be that of the nations, or the European Union, it will turn out 
soon. 
